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CHURCH AND STATE IN NEW MEXICO
1610-1650
By FRANCE V. SCHOLES
CHAPTER

VI

AFTERMATH OF THE ROSAS AFFAIR

1642-1650
I
"S EARLY

as 1638 reports had been received in Mexico City

.IT concerning the differences between Rosas and the
clerical party, and each year thereafter the two factions
sent circumstantial accounts of the situ~tion to the viceroy
and the ecclesiastical authorities· in -the metropolis. The
Franciscan prelates urged Viceroy Cadereitato make a thor- .
ough investigation but to their dismay and disgust he refused to act. He accepted the reports of Rosas as gospel, and
gave the governor his firm support. Thus it was not until
the Marques de Villefia took office as Cadereita's successor
that formal action was taken to provide a remedy for the
sorry state of affairs that had developed in New Mexico.'
Villefia appointed Flores de Valdez to succeed Rosas,
and the Franciscans named Fray Hernando de Covarrubias
as custodian; But the untimely death of Flores created a
new problem to plague the authorities in Mexico.City. Messengers were despatched t~ the capital, and a new governor
was immediately selected to fill the vacancy. The person
chosen for this delicate task-a certain. Alonso Pacheco y
Heredia-left Mexico City during the winter of 1641-1642
and arrived in New Mexico about November 1, 1642," Then in
the spring of 1642 came the astounding news that the cabildo
of Santa Fe had assumed power, that Rosas had been murdered, that Ortiz, after having been tried and acquitted in
Santa Fe, had been arrested· and tried a second time in
Parra!.
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In the meantime events had moved rapidly in Mexico
CitY. The bishop of Puebla, Don Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, acting under authority as visitador of the viceroyalty,
had become the real power in the capital, and in June, 1642,
he removed Villefia and assumed office as viceroy. Thus it
was the stern Palafox who was called upon to deal with the
new crisis in New Mexico.
The reports presented by the pro-Rosas faction were
given full credence by the new viceroy and his advisers.
This is made perfectly clear by the parecer of Do:it Pedro
Melian, fiscal of the audiencia. He placed·the entire blame
for the sad and tragic events in New.Mexico on the clergy .
and their faction. He reported that the governor and the
clergy had quarreled over the problem of Indian labor, the
governor having sought to limit certain abuses, such as the
maintenance of a workshop in one of the convents, whereas
the friars had opposed the governor's authority in the
assignment of Indian laborers to citizens of the colony. Two
friars were accused of complicity in the Sandoval murder,
.and were said to have been shielded by their brother. clergy
when Rosas tried to investigate. Melian also stated that
Vidania, who had arranged for the burial of Sandoval in the
convent church, had been threatened with viol~nce, and had
been obliged to take refuge in the house of the governor.
The gathering of the clergy and soldiers at Santo Domingo
was characterized as outright rebellion. The pueblo had
been made a fortress where the leaders of the clerical faction
remained for sixteen months in open defiance against the
authority of the king's representative. The custodian had
unfurled the standards of the Inquisition and the Crusade,
had prociaimed that the pope· alone should be obeyed, and
had denied all authority of the king under the patronage.
Governor Flores, who succeeded Rosas, had been forced to
oust the.cabildo of loyalists, and to restore encomiendas and
other titles and privileges to the leaders of the rebel faction.
And after his death the cabildo had illegally assumed authority, and had arrested Rosas and plundered him of his prop-
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erty. Then there had followed the murder of Rosas by Ortiz,
who was accompanied on his mission of death by leaders of
the anti-Rosas faction. And the :fiscal pointed out that there
was some evidence to indicate that the alleged adultery of
Rosas and Ortiz' wife was really a plot framed to provide
pretext for killing the ex-governor.
MeHan pointed out the need for proceeding with tact
and deliberation, lest the guilty parties take advantage of
the isolation of New Mexico and the weakness of the loyalist
faction to commit greater crimes and cause the complete
ruin of the province. He recommended consultation with
Fray Juan de Prada, Commissary General of the Franciscan
Order in New Spain, in order to effect the withdrawal from
New Mexico of "the most guilty friars and the principal
instigators of these dissensions," 'Concerning whom proper
action could be taken at a later time. He also suggested
that the governor should make a secret investigation concerning the entire affair, especially the possibility of a plot
in the matter of Rosas' adultery, and to send the leaders of
the sedition to Mexico."
The fiscal's parecer was discussed in the real acuerdo,
and it was decided that before resorting to force an attempt
should be made to remedy the situation 'by other means.
Leaders of the two factions into which the soldiers were
divided,as well as three or four of the most troublesome
friars, were to be summoned to New Spain, and a general
pardon extended to all who remained in the province.
Palafox reported these decisions to the Crown in. a
letter dated July 25, 1642. A copy of the fiscal's parecer
was transmitted with the message.' In August special
instructions were sent to Governor Pacheco y Heredia .to
guide his actions in New Mexico.. And in the autumn of
1642, on relinquishing office to the Conde de Salvatierra;
Palafox gave the new viceroy a long informe on the affairs of
New Spain, in .which he named the friars as the "prime
movers" in the turbulent events in the province of New
Mexico. After outlining the measures that had been taken;
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he informed Salvatierra that it would be necessary to make
a secret examin~tion of the pertinent papers, with the
assistance of the fiscal, because the friars were so skillful
in shifting the blame to others, making it appear that "the
loyalists are the leaders of rebellion, and the rebels are the
loyalists, as has happened on other occasions." 5
But these reports, so hostile to the clergy, did not go
unchallenged. On March 12, 1642, Fray Juan d~ Prada,
Franciscan Commissary-General of New Spain, transmitted
to his superiors in Spain a series of reports describing the
New Mexican crisis from the point of view of the clergy.
Prada's letter contained not only a review of the Rosas
administration from the point of view of the Church, but
also a bitter denunciation of Palafox who was then acting
as visitador of the viCeroyalty~ Prada stated that, follow- ,
ing the death of Flores y Valdez, Rosas tried to reassert
authority and sent several messengers, mulattoes all of·
them, to Mexico City. There they were received and sheltered by Palafox, who listened eagerly to their version of
New MexiCan affairs, especially their denunciation of the
friars. When Pacheco y Heredia, the new governor, set out
for N e~ Mexico, the agents of Rosas departed with him.
But about one hundred leagues from Mexico City Pacheco
and his party met the returning mission caravan which
brought news that the cabildo of Santa Fe, dominated by
Capt. Antonio Baca and his associates, had taken control of
provincial affairs and that Rosas was a prisoner. Rosas'
erstwhile friends immediately retraced their steps to Mexico
City, and confessed to Prada that they had made false statements to Palafox, especially regarding the actions of the
Franciscans in New Mexico. In short, Prada's letter was
not only a, militant defense of his Order, but a scathing condemnation of Bishop Palafox and his motives."
Bishop Palafox's letter and the parecer of the fiscal
were received in Spain sometime during the first half of the
year 1643. The Council voted (1) that Viceroy Salvatierra
should be instructed to give especial attention to the paci~-
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cation of New Mexico to the end that respect for civil
authority should be restored, but without resorting to violence, and (2) that the circumstances of the death of Ro.sas
should be investigated. These recommendations were incorporated in a cedula dated July 14, 1643. At the same time
it was voted that the dispatches from Palafox should be
read to' the Franciscan Commissary General of the Indies
and that it would be convenient for the said Commissary
General to write to the Franciscans of New Spain instructing them to take appropriate action to restore peace arid
quiet among the friars in New Mexico. The Commissary
General tried to justify the actions of the New Mexico clergy
by presentnig Prada's reports and the accompanying
papers, but his representations had little effect. He fQuIi.d
it necessary to instruct Prada to confer with Viceroy Salvatierra and appoint a suitable person to be sent to New
Mexico to make a th~roughinvestig~tion on behalf of the
Franciscan Order!
II

"
While the king and council were reviewing the reports
that had been received from New Spain, events of great
importance were taking place in New Mexico. The special
instructions that were sent to the new governor, Alonso de
Pacheco y Heredia, in the summer of 1642, after Palafox
and his advisers had received the news orf the murder of
Rosas, provide the key to these events and deserve. detailed
notice. In the first place, Palafox -issued a formal decree in
which he authorized the new governor to grant a pardon
"with limitation or without limitation, as may seem convenient,'to any captains, citizens, soldiers, and inhabitants of
the province" who had participated in the long series of
disturbances during'Rosas' adrriinistration and after. The
decree stated further that whomever Pacheco pardoned the
viceroy would also pardon in the king's name. Second, a
secret instruction drawn up by the real acuerdo, was transmitted with the decree of pardon, in which Pacheco was
.given specific orders' concerning the policy to be followed
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with regard to certain persons who had been leaders of the
anti-Rosas faction. The secret orders instructed Pacheco
to inform himself concerning all of the events that had taken
place subsequent to 1637, and to investigate "extra-judicially" the circumstances concerning the imprisonment and.
death of Rosas. Having made this investigation he should
then send a secret report of the same to Mexico City. If
Pacheco issued the general pardon authorized by Palafox,
exceptions were to be made in the persons of Antonio Baca,
Francisco de Salazar, Juan Lujan, Francisco Lujan, and
Juan de Archuleta, as leaders of the "revolt and sedition,"
and any other persons who had had a leading part in the
arrest and death of Rosas. But such persons wer~ not to
be informed of this reservation; rather, Pacheco was instructed to dissimulate, and to find a way to induce the aforesaid persons to go to Mexico, together with two or three
leaders of the opposing faction, in order to present reports on
,the situation to the viceregal court. If, however, it was not
possible ,to' arrange for their departure in this manner, Pacheco was authorized to seize them and send them in custody
to Nueva Vicaya. But if they were likely to be rescued on the
way, and p1'ovided that their guilt 'Was clear, then it would
be better "to get rid of them by a brief and exemplary punishment" which would cause all the other malcontents to
have proper respect for "the royal name of His Majesty
and his Ministers."·
Thus Palafox and' the audiencia clearly designated
several persons who were under grave suspicions not only
of sedition, but also complicity in a cold-blooded murder.
To investigate the charge and find safe means for removing
the suspected parties were Pacheco's main responsibility,'
for the viceregal authorities hoped to avoid further shedding
of blood in New Mexico and wished to reserve to themselves
the final decision concerning the guilt of accused parties.
On the other hand, Pacheco had full authority to take drastic
action if circumstances warranted it. it is interesting to
note that neither the general pardon nor the secret instrtic-

84

NEW ME,XICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

tions mentioned in any manner the. actions of the clergy.
Palafox was convinced that the friars had had an active
part in the recent unhappy events in New Mexico but disciplinary measures in this case were to be left to the Franciscan prelates, in accordance with the principles of ecclesiastical privilege;
On his .arrival in New Mexico Pacheco received a cordial reception from all parties. The cabildo, in which Baca
and his followers exercised the pr:edominant influence,
turned over the government without any resistance.. And
Custodian Covarrubias took special pains to inform Pacheco
that during the preceding months there had been complete
harmony between the Church and the governing authorities." It was inevitable,. however, that the policies of the
new governor should receive close scrutiny. The pro-Rosas
faction naturally hoped that Pacheco would justify them,
if not provide a means of revenge against their enemies.
The cabildoand leaders of the clerical party longed earnestly
to know the exact nature of the go~ernor's instructions.
'Pacheco made every effort to quiet all fears, and on January
6, 1643, he published Bishop Palafox's decree of pardon.'•
Moreover, he appointed several of the' former anti-RoSas
leaders to military positions on the frontier and used them
as leaders of punitive expeditions against the Apaches. By
so doing he not only made a show of conciliation, but also
removed the suspected parties from provincial headquarters
whiie he made the secret investigation ordered by the viceroy. In Santa Fe new cabildo elections, resulted in the loss of
leadership by Antonio Baca's group, wh,o were replaced by
men more friendly to the Rosas party. Thus Pacheco managed to satisfy, partially at least, the aspiration and hopes
of both factions.
The clergy; under the leadership of Custodian Covarrubi~s, adopted a policy of concilIation, and the governor
lost no time in acknowledging this friendly assistance. The
bones of Rosas received absolution and were given a formal
military burial in the Santa Fe church, and in a letter of
ill
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thanks, dated December 17, 1642, Pacheco told the custodian
, that henceforth he should be called Fray Hernando de la
Paz. The prelate also aided the governor in other ways,
such as lending horses for a campaign against the Navahos,
and Pacheco expressed warm appreciation of such whole,
hearted cooperation.'" 'While thus following a policy of
friendly relationships with all groups, Pacheco secretly
ma<ie an inquiry concerning the past events, particularly
the circumstances surrounding the death of Rosas. The
secret instruction charged him to obtain the truth from "the
persons of the best standing and reputation," but according
to the clerical faction he relied solely on members of the proRosas group for his information." In any case, he reached
the conclusion that Antonio Baca and his followers were the
real leaders of the seditioI! and that they were also accomplices in the murder not only of Rosas but also of Sandoval.
And he likewise decided that the proper remedy was immediate action!
On July 21, 1643, 'he summoned a few trustworthy soldiers-it may be noted that they included both Francisco
Gomez and Pedro Lucero de Godoy-and executed that
"brief and exemplary punishment" authorized by the secret
instruction. Eight soldiers-Antonio Baca, Francisco de
Salazar, Cristobal Enriquez, Juan de Archuleta, Diego Marquez, Diego Martin Barba, Nicolas Perez, and Juan Rl,1iz de
Hinojos-were beheaded in quick succession."
The first four persons in the list have been mentioned
'many times in the preceding chapters as leaders of the antiRosas party, and it is not surprising that they were included
among the guilty. Diego Martin Barba had been a Rosas
man but he had served as captain of the guard at Rosas'
house on the night the ex-governor was murdered, and the
testimony of his fellow guards during the trial of Ortiz made
it fairly clear that he refused to take any effective measures
to resist Ortiz and his companions when they burst into the
house. Apparently this failure to perform his duty--even
though he was serving as guard unwillingly---cost him his
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life. Diego Marquez was ,one of the persons named by Ortiz
during the retrial in Parral as one of his accomplices. When
Ortiz was arrested in Parral in the spring of 1642 he was
accompanied by a Nicolas Perez, and it may be possible that
he was regarded with suspicion on that account. The role
played by Juan de Hinojos is unknown, hence no reason can
be given for the inclusion of his name on the list.
When Custodian Covarrubias presented his version of
the fateful July days, he reported one incident which is
worthy of being retold here. It seems that when the executioners proceeded to take the life of Francisco Salazar they
used the victim's own dagger. But it was dull, and they
had some difficulty in severing the head from the body.
Whereupon Salazar cried: "For God's sake, sharpen that
thing and put me out of my misery." The executioners did
as requested, and soon finished their business. And then!
To the astonishment and edification of all, the severed head
repeated the Creed through from beginning to end!
Later in the afternoon of July 21, after the executions
had been completed, Pacheco summoned the citizens and
once more published the decree of pardon, this time making
public the secret ~nstructions. At the same time he announced the execution of the eight soldiers and ordered the
head of Antonio Baca to be nailed to the gibbet as a solemn
warning to all. He also decreed the seizure of the property
of the executed parties, to be used in defraying the cost of a
force of thirty soldiers enlisted that very day to serve. in
securing the peace and conservation of the prqvi~ce. Finally,
he announced that the punishment already exacted was sufficient to satisfy the needs of justice, and promised pardon to
all lesser leaders and accomplices provided they rallied to the
royal standard and sought the king's grace within two
weeks."
Several of the lesser leaders-Don Fernando Chavez y
Duran, Diego de la Serna, Juan Lujan, Diego Perez Granillo,
Don Juan Ramirez de Salazar, and Andes Lopez de Gracia
-had been.appointed to office as alcaldes mayores, partly as
15
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a means of testing their loyalty, and the prompt manner in
which they rallied to the governor's call on July 21, despite
the fact that some of the soldiers who suffered the supreme
penalty were their relatives, was regarded as proof of, their
allegiance. Consequently an order was drawn up on July
22 declaring that they had justified the governor's confidence and confirming them in their offices and titles. Within a short time all others who had shared in the disobedience
to Rosas' orders received full pardon. Citizens assembled
from all parts of the. province, caciques of several pueblos
were called to Santa Fe to share in the proceedings, and on
July 30' the pacification was celebrated by formal religious
services in the Santa Fe church, during which both the custodian and the governor made speeches on' the subject of
,loyalty and obedience to the king and his representatives.
Reports were immediately sent to New Spain. In two
letters, one addressed to his uncle, the Franciscan provincial'
in Mexico City, and one to the viceroy, Pacheco presented his
version of the situation.'s He stated that responsibility
for the defiance of Rosas' authority during the year' 16401641 rested with the soldiers. For many years-ever since
Peralta's time-there had existed a faction comprised of restless men whose allegiance to civil authority was questionable
and whose capacity for trouble-making constituted a serious
problem., Pacheco cited the murder of Sandoval as the chief
cause of 'antagonism against, Rosas. Juan de Archuleta
was arrested as an accomplice, but the faction hostile to
Rosas forced his release. This did not suffice to quiet their
anger, however, and they continued to commit other
offenses. Finally, the serious disagreement between Rosas
and Custodian Salas over the Vidania case gave the soldiers
the opportunity to use the Church as a screen to hide their
real purposes-rebellion and personal revenge. Gathering
in Santo Domingo 'on the pretext of protecting the friars,
they turned the place into a fortress and made it the center
of their intrigue. "If the friars had resisted, [the rebels]
would have killed them and destroyed the convent." So
l7
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powerful did they become, "that even the barbarous Indians
were more obedient to and more fearful of their" echoes than
the decrees of the King Our Lord." After a temporary submission during the administration of Flores, they seized
the opportunity presen"ted by his death to seize power again
and to exact the final revenge against Rosas. The whole Ortiz
affair was a plot which provided them the excuse to cause
the assassination of their enemy, and to put the guilt on
Ortiz alone. And following that, the property of Rosas was
greedily snatched up, with the result that only two hundred
pesos' worth remained when Pacheco arrived. More, the
local archive was despoiled of aU papers relating to these
sorry events.
Thus, according to Pacheco, the exemplary punishment
of the chief conspirators and accomplices was absolutely
necessary in order to" restore the prestige of constituted
authority. And the reaction of all classes had more than
justified his action. All of the lesser leaders of the sedition,
without exception, had rallied to the royal standard and
had received formal pardon. The caciques and captains of
the Indian pueblos had been greatly impressed by the swift
execution of justice, declaring that it was the best thing that
had ever happened in New Mexico. Finally, the clergycustodian, defuiitors, and friars-had presented themselves
in Santa Fe with the same sub~ission and obedience as "enlisted soldiers;" and the custodian had sounded the call of
loyalty by declaring in his sermon that if the governor
lacked the power to impose obedience to the king, h~ and
his friars would take up arms and sacrifice their lives in the
royal service. "Thus the entire realm is at peace,-Not only
[the citizens] who remained loyaJ and faithful during the
past unhappy period, but also the relatives of the executed
parties. And now, after receiving general pardon, they are
greatly pl~ased arid relieved to find themselves freed of their
leaders, who, actiIlg with superior authority, caused great
harm to their honor and lives.
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The most striking thing in Pacheco's dispatches was his
insistence that the soldiers had turned the gathering of
friars in Santo Domingo to their own selfish use. The friars
had been helpless to resist. As a result, however, they had
appeared to protect the leaders of sedition and had been
accused of a share in the open and violent opposition to
constituted .civil authority. "I certify to your excellency,"
Pacheco wrote, "how unjustly the reputation of this 'sacred
Order has been calumniated. Because in all truth, they are
true followers of the Apostles and exemplary sons of my
great Father St. Francis." These statements of Governor
Pacheco are a welcome antidote to the wild ravings of
Vidania:, and to the patently unfair statements in the parecer
of Melian, which, of course, was based on prejtIdiced reports.
But there is also a ring of insincerity about them. Pacheco
was entirely too eager to prove that, by his wise administration of provincial affairs and his drastic punishment of a few
leaders, he had brought peace once more to harrassed New
Mexico. As a matter of fact, there was bitter resentment
against the governor, not only among the relatives and followers of the soldiers who had paid the penalty of death, but
also among the clergy.
On June 1, 1643, more than a month prior to the execution of Baca and his associates, Custodian Covarrubias wrote
a letter to the viceroy which is extremely illuminating.' •
Referring to the meeting of the friars at Santo Domingo in
1640, Covarrubias stated:
"Many friars . . . fearful of his (Rosas')
cruelty and tyranny, decided to gather with their
prelates in a convent· called Santo Domingo, and
there, lest the said Rosas take their lives (as was his
intention on various occasions) they were protected by the most faithful and loyal vassals of his
Majesty the King Our Lord, and without their aid
not a church would have remained standing, not a
friar alive."
This statement compares with many others found in the
letters and reports of the friars. The Church regarded the
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anti-Rosas faction as its staunch- defenders and as loyal subjects of the Crown. There is nothing in the words of Custodian Covarrubias to justify Pacheco's point of view that
the soldiers terrorized the friars into acquiescence with their
purposes.
The custodian also took pains to point out that there
had been peace and quiet during the period when the cabildo
exercised authority as governor ad interim following the
death of Flores. The clergy had cooperated with the cabildo
wholeheartedly, had furnished horses and mules for cam- paigns against the Apaches, and the cabildo had publicly
acknowledged the custodian's efforts in behalf of peace in
_two letters of thanks. Moreover, on various occasions the
citizens had met in public gathering to disc.uss provincial
affairs, "as -a result of which all were in unanimous agreement, and all swore not to break the peace." Thus there was
no truth in the report that the pr<;>vince was in confusion
when Pacheco arrived, and that by his care and diligence
peace had been restored. "If such a report should come to
the hands of Your Excellency, may you be pleased to put
no faith in it."
Covarrubias then enumerated several causes for complaint against the governor. First, he had appointed alcaldes rnayores in most of the mission areas where only
Indians lived, "a thing never done before." Second, he had
followed the example of all his predecessors. in furthering
his own personal interests at the expense of the community.
By one pretext or another, he obtained possession of horses
and mules belonging to both citizens and clergy without adequate compensation; and as juez de bienes de difuntos
(administrator of the estates of persons whose heirs or
beneficiaries lived elsewhere) he managed to have the he,rds
of deceased persons sold at auction at reduced prices to
agents who purchased the same for his private account.
Such practices were not only unjust, but they represented a
real danger to the province, which needed all of the livestock
that it could possibly obtain. "It is necessary that Your
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Excellency should order the said governor, or the person
who succeeds him ... not to take from this (land) more
horses than are necessary for his personal needs."
Third, the governor had considered the imposition of
new regulations regarding the payment of tributes. Whereas in the past the levy of tribute had been by households,
. each household paying one cotton manta and a fan ega of
maize per year, Pacheco had proposed to make the levy on a
per capita'basis. It was the custodian's view, that the old
levy was frequently very oppressive, especially in years
when the cotton crop failed. To increase the total amount of
the tributes by changing the basis of assessment would
cause great harm and suffering.
Fourth, Pacheco had made exceptional demands for
" special privileges during religious service, and by unseemly
conduct during the public celebration. of ecclesiastical feasts
had scandalized both Indians and Spaniards. Finally, he
had revoked and regranted encomiendas in order to cause
lawsuits during which he could make personal.use of the
revenue of the .encomiendas in question.
These were serious charges, and they indicate. clearly
enough that Pacheco's reports concerning the prevalence of
peace and harmony were not justified. Then on September
29,1643, Friars Covarrubias, Salas and Suarez signed a long
report which reviewed the events of July 21 et seq."" On
July 23 Governor Pacheco met Friar Juan de San Joseph,
the cu'stodian's personal companion, and in the presence of
a great crowd of people said:
"Father Friar Juan, ... tell the Father Custo~
dian what I say-that I am most ·devoted to the
[Franciscan] Order and to this holy habit [of the
Order], and that I esteem the most humble donado
of the Order-But I swear by the life of the king,
and by this holy temple and God and San Antonio,
that if he does not approve what I have done, and if
I know that he speaks badly of it and causes
tro~ble, I shall have to behead him as [I should] a
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Moor or a Turk, and throw him out to be eaten by
wild animals; and that I would do this to a bishop,
and as much and more to a custodian."

To which Friar Juan replied that the Father Custodian had
never been a trouble maker, and would not be one now.
"And the same day," reported Covarrubias, "[Friar Juan]
gave me the message, and I [gave] thanks to Our Lord."
'On July 26 the governor sent the custodian a formal
oider to appear in Santa Fe accompanied by the definitors
and other prominent clergy within three days, under penalty
of being declared seditious and a traitor to the Crown.
'Covarrubias courteously replied that he would hasten to
obey the command. On July 29 the custodian and ten other
friars presented themselves in Santa Fe. In the afternoon
Covarr.ubias and the venerable Friar: Cristobal de Quiros
paid a formal call at the governor's residence, and Pacheco
explained that the execution of the eight soldiers had been
in conformity with secret instructions. The custodian replied that whatever royal authority ordered should be exe.,
cuted to the letter with all' care and diligence.
On the following day, July 30, by command of the governor a special mass was s;;tid in the convent church. And
Custodian Covarrubias took the opportunity to make a short
address to the assembled citizens, pointing out the need for
peace, for observance of divine precepts, and for obedience
to the king, his royal councils, and his governors and other
ministers.' He exhorted the friars to recognize the great
obligations of their station and reminded them of the
benefits and Joyal support they received from the Crown.
And he ended by declaring that the friars were obliged to
take arms, if necessary, against those who were disloyal,
rebellious alid disobedient to the royal commands. Following the,custodian's speech, Pacheco made another in similar
vein.
Thus; on the surface, all was harmonious. But during
the same day Pacheco visited the custodian and friars in the
convent and took occasion to berate them and upbraid them
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in shameful fashion.
"Among other things," he told
Covarrubias that he was "the most arrogant friar' in the
,world."
The contrast between this version of the July days and
those contained in Pacheco's own letters proves clearly how
utterly the governor had failed to win the friendship of the
friars. And later e,vents merely deepened the resentment
felt by, the custodian and his associates.
It will be recalled that one cause of trouble between
Rosas and Father Salas was the burial of Sebastian de Sandoval, an excommunicate, in the Santa Fe church by consent
of Friar Juan de Vidania. As a result of this incident and
others that followed, Salas placed the Santa Fe church under
interdict. When Governor Flores and Custodian Covarrubias arrived in 1641, the body of Sandoval was exhumed and
buried in unconsecrated ground, and the interdict had be€m
raised. But now, Governor Pacheco' ordered Sandoval's
bones disinterred once more, and on August 16, 1643,' he ,
sent word to Covarrubias asking the necessary authorization
to rebury them in the Santa Fe church. In his reply the custodian reviewed the facts as outlined above, pointing out
that it was on his initiative that action had been taken to
remove the bones in 1641, and that he could not comply with
the governor's request. '
The next day, August 17, there appeared in Santo Domingo, where Covarrubias was living, Sargento Mayor Francisco Gomez and two companions who brought threats of
dire consequences if the burial of Sandoval was not authorized.
"He [the governor] sent Francisco Gomez
with the Secretary Libron, and Agustin Griego to
tell me orally that I should give permission to bury
the said bones at once, and that if I did not do so,
the governor would come in person the following
night and take me from this convent and send me
away in a pack saddle under guard of soldiers, who
would take me to EI Paso del Rio del Norte and
leave me there alone, where either enemies (hostile Indians?) 'or wild beasts would tear me to
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pieces; and that if as a result of these threats and
many others that they made ... I would not give
the said permission they would give me official notification of an auto containing the greatest enormities;, such as a man who had totally abandoned
God or [even] a heretic could not boast. And that
because of me the land was in a miserable state,
and that in this convent meetings were being held,
inspired by opposition to the Crown and that other
things of grave import were being done; and that
he would have to raze this convent and take my life,
and do other dreadful things."

. In order to delay giving an answer, the custodian asked for
a copy of the governor's command and requested time in
which to prepare a reply. Gomez replied that tpey had no
authorization to grant the requests, and with that word he
and his companions departed.
On August 18 Captain . Francisco Lujan teniente of
Cochiti, and two soldiers, acting on command of Governor
Pacheco, arirved in Santo Domingo. After calling together
all of the Indians, they read an order forbidding any Indian,
on pain of death, to do anything commanded by the custodian and other friars of the convent.
"This caused such scandal and fear in these
wretched Indians, men and women, boys and girls,
that they walked about as if dazed, and they withdrew to their cornfields, and other places. Not a
single person was to be seen in the plazas and
houses; and when they came, it was with great
secrecy, as if it were a matter of life and death to be
seen by the friars."
At thIS critical juncture Friar Juan de Salas, the for- .mer custodian, was sent to Santa Fe to act as mediator.
"With modesty and prudence" he calmed the' excited governor, who agreed to make peace. On August 22 Pacheco
visited Santo Domingo, where he summoned the Indians and
told them that he had issued his former order in order to
test their obedience, "and also because he was angry." "And
with that things remained as tliey were before."-
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But this act of public peacemaking did not reestablish
genuine confidence and good feeling between the two principal parties. Things had gone too far for that. Covarrubias continued to fear some sort of violence and he determined to leave Santo Domingo for a while and spend some
time visiting the convents in the area east of the Manzano
range,-"in order to see whether I could free myself somewhat of his threats and calumnies, and [because] I was also
afraid that he might take my life, either publicly or by
means of· some poison."
The letterof September 29, 1643, in which these events
were described was dated at the convent of Cuarac, and was
signed by ex-Custodian Salas; guardian of the convent, and
by Friar Juan Suarez, guardian of San Felipe. The last
paragraph stated that it was desired that other friars should
sign the dispatch, but it could not .safely be sent from convent to convent because mail was being seized and opened.
As final proof (if indeed, additional proof is necessary)
that Pacheco had stirred up great resentment may be cited
the fact that the relatives of the eighfsoldiers who had been
beheaded immediately filed suit for redress before the Audiencia. Among the petitioners were Fernando de Chavez y
Duran and Juan Ramirez de Salazar, two of those lesser
leaders against Rosas whom Pacheco had placed in positions·
of trust in order to test their loyalty and whom he had formally pardoned by decree of July 22 as a reward for their
prompt answer to summons on the day of the executions. In
short, fear rather than genuine approval of the governor's
action was the force which prompted the rallying to the
royal standard during the days subsequent to July 21. The
suit for redress was filed in Mexico City on November 27,
1643. Criminal charges were preferred against Governor
Pacheco, and petition was made seeking the vindication of
the honor of the persons who had been executed and the res..:.
titution of their properly to their heirs. Unfortunately the
result of this case is not known'"
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III
. In January 1644, Friar Juan de Prada, the Franciscan
commissary general of New Spain, received the order from
his superior in Spain instructing him to consult with the
viceroy and appoint a suitable person to investigate the conduct of the clergy in New Mexico. The person who was
selected for this task was Friar Tomas Manso. F~r more
than a decade. Manso had been serving as procurator general of the Custodia of New Mexico and administrator of th~
mission supply service. In this capacity he had demonstrated considerable ability arid had rendered genuine service to the missions. And the Franciscan Order had already
recognized his talents and good judgment by electing hUn
custodian to succeed Father Covarrubias. Thus toward the
end' of 1643 he had set out for New Mexico once more with
the heavy responsibility of the custodianship added to the
management of the caravan which'departed at the same
time. And on August 14, 1644,several weeks after arriving in New Mexico he received the commission from Prada
commanding him to make the general investigation ordered
by the commissary general in Spain. 22
Father Manso immediately drew up a questionnaire on
the basis of which witnesses were to be examined, and on
August 17 the first testimony was received. A week later
the' investigation was finished. Six witnesses had been
calied, of whom three were petitioners in the criminal suit
against Governor Pacheco mentioned above. The testimony
was wholly in favor of the clergy; it placed, all the blame on
Rosas and Vidania, and the assembling of the soldiers at
Santo Domingo was justified as the action of loyal soldiers
rallying to the defense of the clergy. Father Manso anticipated the obvious criticism that would be directed against
his investigation, and explained to his superiors that lack of
time made it impossible to make a thorough inquiry reaching
back to the beginning of the Rosas affair. Moreover, he
stated that };I,e had deemed it unwise to ask for assistance
from the governor. Manso pointed out that while Pacheco

i.
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was willing to do anything that would justify the conduct of
the friars, he was motivated also py a desire "to calumniate
the dead." "And for that 'reason I did not wish to seek his
lordship's aid, or to discuss anything with him." 23 ,
It is obvious, of course, that Manso and his associates
were thoroughly convinced that Rosas and Vidania had
caused all the trouble, that the soldiers who supported the
Church were in no sense guilty of sedition, and that the
charges which had been made against the clergy by the proRosas faction were utterly false. To quote Father Manso:
"The case is very grave, M,ost Reverend
Father, and it is necessary to state it clearly and
that the truth should be known. Because in New
Mexico there has been no rebellion, no denial of
obedience owed to Our King and Lord, neither on
the part of the friars nor on that of the laymen."
He explained that certain laymen had withdrawn from
Santa Fe, partly because of serious grievances suffered at
the hands of Rosas, partly because they refused to accept the
sacraments from an excommunicate priest. But this did not
constitute, treason. Manso admitted that the cabildo had
seized power at the death of Flores; but he also took pains to
point out that the cabildo had performed a great service by
taking stern measures against the Apaches, and that Pacheco
had been immediately recognized as lawful governor when
he arrived in 1642. It should be noted, on the other hand,
that Manso ,made no reference to the murder of Rosas and
.the acquittal of Ortiz.""
After all, the friars regarded the whole sorry business
as merely one more incident illustrating the tyranny and
injustice -of the provincial governors. And Pacheco was no
exception; The difficulties between F'ather Covarrubias and
Governor Pacheco prior to the autumn of 1643 have already
been noted. And it is apparent that the situation became
even more tense as the months passed by. In fact, we 'have
one brief but significant statement which indicates that on
one occasion Pacheco even placed the custodian under guard
in the convent of Sia.""
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A new governor was finally appointed in the person of
Fernando de Argiiello, but he was delayed in making the
journey to New Mexico, with the result that Pacheco remained in office until December 5, 1644. And during the last
six or eight months of his term Pacheco apparently became
even more unreasonable and arbitrary. Covarrubias and
Manso returned to New Spain with the mission caravan in
the autumn of 1644."
IV
The documentary evidence for the Rosas-FloresPacheco period comes to a rather abrupt end at this point.
We are left in the dark concerning the final decision in the
criminal suit brought against Pacheco by the relatives of
the soldiers who were executed. Apparently Pach~o remained in New Mexico until 1647, and it is possible that he
had orders to remain pending the settlement of the suit, or,
more probably, during the taking of his residencia. Unfortunately Pacheco's residencia, as most of the New Mexico
residencias for this period, is missing. Friar Prada took
pains to send to Spain copies of all the reports received from
New Mexico, especially the letters of Pacheco which exculpated the friars. But we have no information to indicate
the final judgment of the viceroy and the. Crown concerning the role played by the clergy during these. years. Lack
of documents may even indicate that the governing authorities of Mexico and Spain felt that the wisest policy was to let
the situation qUIet down; and not to cause more trouble by
further investigations or by making formal judgmentsconcerning the responsibility of either individuals or gToups.
Thus the Rosas episode finally became past history.
But the old suspicions, rivalries, jealousies, and bitterness
lived on. And ,ve close this chapter by presenting the summary of a letter addressed to the king on October 23, 1647,
by Friar Andres Juarez, senior friar in the province.'"
All of the governors, he said, had been guilty of misgovernment and tyranny, except one (probably Silva Nieto)
who was "the protector of this land," but he would limit ~is
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bill of particulars to the last three governors-Pacheco,
Argiiello, and Guzman y Figuera (who succeeded Argiiello
in 1647). Pacheco and Arguello were leaving with the mission caravan, one of them in custody for having sold powder
belonging to the Crown, the other free because of bribes he
had given. Juarez did not mention names, so we cannot be
sure whether it was Pacheco or Arguello who was in custody.) They had been a scourge on the land~heating
"these poor natives and Spaniards." Divine law, royal
ordinances and cedulas had been broken. "May I be cursed
of God," Juarez exclaimed, "if they have kept a single command of Your Majesty."
But what can be done? The governors are either creatures of the viceroy, or they buy their offices. Argiiello had
asserted that the office cost him 9,000 pesos. And of course
the natives and Spaniard paid it in the end!
The Indians were forced to purchase goods offered for
sale by the governor's agents, who took what they desired in
payment. And expeditions were constantly being organized
for the purpose ,of seizing Apache captives to be sold as
slaves in New Spain, with the result that the Apaches
naturally made counterattacks on the pueblos-"as happened during the time of the past governor, when they killed
forty persons in one pueblo and seized eight prisoners."
Disagreements between the governors and the clergy
were still .common. Guzman had violated the right of asylum and had made threats against the prelate who had protested against his action. Arguello had upbraid~d friar
who had whipped an Indian for certain offenses, and had
told the Indians that if a friar tried to punish them in this
manner again they should kill (fie char) him. But such
intervention in behalf of the indians ~as inspired by no
genuine regard for their welfare. On the contrary, Arguello
like all his kind, had exploited the Indian labor, and permitted the Spaniards to do the same. As a result of these
disagreements between secular and ecclesiastical authority,

a
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and of such ruthless exploitation, the Indians no lqnger
obeyed their friars and were returning to idolatry.
It was the' same old refrain! And like hundreds of
other letters on the same subject it achieved nothing. The
Crown, by cedula of September 22, 1650, ordered the viceroy
to investigate and make a report. On March 20, 1653, the
viceroy replied that he had giveri a newly-appointed governor, Don Juan de Samaniego, suitable instructions. The
Crown on June 20, 1654, approved of the viceroy's report,
and charged him to continue to give special attention to the
matter in question! '"
I
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

THE decade of the 1650's there seems to have
D.., URING
been a lull in the rivalry and controversy between the

secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. At least, that may
be inferred from the notable lack of documentary material
for this period. And when the old quarrel was revived in
1659 it quickly assumed a new character,-not because the
issues were changed, but because the Church was able to
invoke all the power of the Inquisition on its side. Thus the
story of the period from 1659 to 1665 is essentially a chapter
in the history of the Holy Office in New Spain. For that
reason I bring the present essay t~ a close and reserve the
later period for separate study.
But· the fundamental issues ever remained the same:
rivalry for control of the destiny of the Indians, problems
of mission discipline, the conflict of economic interests, the
question of ecclesiastical immunity, the, authority of the
custodian as ecclesiastical judge ordinary, the proper exercise of ecclesiastical censures, and interference of the clergy
in strictly secular matters. In one form or another these
problems were presented again and again, but neither State
nor Church learned the need for patience, tact, and friendly
cooperation in dealing with them. Permanent compromises
were never found, and the tradition of rivalry and hostility
became one of the powerful traditions in provincial life.
The causes of conflict were inherent in the general
colonial system evolved for the government of the Spanish
Indies. The religious and economic motives of empire were
antagonistic if not essentially incompatible. This fact was
reflected in the legislation where contradictions were numerous and notorious, and the processes of administration ofter,
caused greater confusion instead of providing effective compromises. Thus the history of New Mexico serves as an
example of the general trend of politico-ecclesiastical relations in the Indies.
I
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It may seem surprising, on first thought, that fundamental questions of ecclesiastical privilege. and jurisdiction
should have played an important part in the history of such
an isolated,. poverty-ridden frontier province. But if we
consider the problem more closely, the explanation is obvious
enough. The very. simplicity of political, social, and economic conditions permitted such issues to assume a greater
relative importance than would have been the case if life
had been more varied and complex. Moreover, certain
.special factors in the development of New Mexico during the
seventeenth century'':'''-the emphasis on the missions, the
distance from the centers of superior authority, and· the
character of provincial leaders--contributed much to the
aggravation of the problem. These.were discussed in Chapter I of this essay, and no·further comment is necessary.
The leaders of both State and Church must assume
considerable responsibility for the bitterness and violence
which characterized this New Mexican chapter of politicoecclesiastical relatiQns in the colonies. In the Peralta affair
Friar Isidro Ord6fiez not only exceeded his legal· authority,
but was guilty of gross discourtesy and presumption in dealing with the Crown's representative. On the other hand,
Rosas was responsible for. brazen violation of fundamental
Church law and practice. Eulate, Baeza, and Rosas were
all too much interested in their own selfish gain to give effective service in a mission province. But it is equally true
that Friars Perea and Quiros were sometimes guilty' of an
uncompromising insistence on ecclesiastical authority and
privilege, which made cooperation with secular authority
difficult. Above all, there was too much attention paid to
non-essenti.als by both governors and prelates.
One of the most important phases of the entire controversy was the abuse of power on each side. Ecclesiastical'
authority and privilege were expanded to cover a multitude
of personal and group interests. The mission program in its
broadest aspects, as conceived by the clergy, implied a genuine invasion of the limits of secular authority as defined by
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law. On the other hand, the civil authorities were guilty of
numerous violations of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. And the
wide authority enjoyed by the provincial governors, such as
the right to regulate Indian labor, grant encomiendas, fix
tributes, supervise pueblo government, and regulate relations with the Apache tribes was often exercised in a manner
detrimental to the general mission program. But this is
merely to restate the fundamental conflict of motives inherent in the colonial system.
Two immediate results of the controversy may· be noted
in New Mexico.
1. It created a fatal division in the non-aboriginal
community. The bickering, quarrels, and occasional outbursts of violence between the heads of the two jurisdictions
weakened the authority and prestige of. the provincial government. And a permanent spirit of factionalism was introduced as an important factor in the life of the non-aboriginal
community. Although two small groups were formed, one
traditionally loyal to the civil authorities and one sympathetic to the Church and the missions, most of the soldiers
and colonists had no firm convictions on the important issues.
Their allegiance was given first to one side, then to the
other, in accordance with personal selfish interests. We
must remember that the non-aboriginal population consisted mostly of frontier soldiers who had seen service in
Nueva Vizcaya and other parts of northern New Spain, the
rough and often illiterate descendants of these soldiers, a
large group of mestizos,' a sprinkling of mulattoes, and a
number of 'ex-convicts and fugitives from justice. They
were men who chafed tinder restraint, whether from State
or Church. The controversies between governor and prelate, with the. consequent weakening of governmental
authority, gave them greater independence of action. It
was nQt without reason that Otermin in 1682 bitterly denounced "the spirit of insubordination that had long characterized provincial affairs.
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2. The Church-State rivalry had a most unfortunate
effect on the Indian population. The Spanish occupation
had been· a rude shock to the traditional folk culture, and
although the Indians had been forced to acquiesce in the
change, they had never wholeheartedly accepted the new
ways. The substitution of the Christian. faith, ceremonial,
and standards of conduct for age-old folk custom could be
successful only after a long period of the most patient labor.
It presupposed also thorough cooperation between the secular
and ecclesiastical authorities. The Indians learned soon
enough, moreover, that acceptance of Christianity carried
with it the inescapable obligation to serve the representatives of the new regime, both soldiers and friars, and we
can not blame them if they were more conscious of present
burdens than of the spiritual benefits that would accrue
mostly in future. "p"nder such circumstances the sorry spectacle of unseemly quarreling, disagreement on matters of .
mission discipline and general Indian policy, the imprisonment and public humiliation of Governor Peralta, the abusive language and physical violence used by Rosas against
Friars Romero and Nufiez-all this had a most demoralizing
effect on the Indians who had little understanding of the
issues at stake.
The complaint of Friar Andres Juarez that the Indians
were returning to idolatry was not idle talk. From 1632 on,
there was a definite slowing down of the mission program.
The names of Porras and Letrado, San Lucas and Miranda,
had been added to the roll of martyr friars, and there were
increasing signs of a general spirit of revolt against the
new ways. During the administration of Governor Arguello
(1644-1647) the Jemez, in league with Apaches, became insubordinate and killed a Spaniard. Several of the leaders
were hanged, others whipped, and some given terms of
service. And again in the time of Governor Ugarte de la
Concha there was a ·more general conspiracy involving
the Indians of Isleta, Alameda, San Felipe, Cochiti, and
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the Jemez, as well as certain Apache groups. The movement failed, however, and nine of the conspirators were
hanged. These abortive movements were important danger
signals, but unfortunately, they were not heeded.
The forces which produced the explosion of 1680 were
already at work.
(The End)

